Imagine if I said, “Don’t like slavery, then don’t own one.” If I said that, you would immediately realize that I did not truly grasp why people believe that slavery is wrong. It is not wrong because I don’t like it. It’s wrong because slaves are intrinsically valuable human beings who are not by nature property. Whether I like slavery or not is not relevant to the question of whether slavery is wrong. Imagine another example, “Don’t like spousal abuse, then don’t beat your spouse.” Again, the wrongness of spousal abuse does not depend on my preferences or tastes. In fact, if someone liked spousal abuse, we would say that that he or she is evil or sick. We would not adjust our view of the matter and I [sic] say, “I guess spousal abuse is right for you, but not for me.” In short, when the abortion-choice advocate tells the pro-life advocate, “Don’t like abortion; don’t have one,” he fails to grasp what the latter is truly claiming. The pro-lifer isn’t stating his preferences; he’s stating what’s right and wrong regardless of his likes and dislikes.
Klusendorf, Scott. The Case for Life: Equipping Christians to Engage Culture